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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL,
Plaintiff,
No. 18120
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and CAROL PETERSEN,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original proceeding brought before this
Court to review the decision of the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission concerning a claim for unemployment
compensation by defendant Carol Petersen.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE COMMISSION
After unemployment compensation was initially denied
by the Utah Department of Employment Security, a hearing
was held before an appeals referee.

The referee

affirrn~d

the denial of compensation based upon the finding that
defendant Carol Petersen had voluntarily terminated her
employment without good cause.

The decision of the referee

was appealed to the Board of Review which reversed the
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previous finding and held that Carol Petersen was entitled
to unemployment compensation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision rendered by
the Board of Review and restitution of any amounts debited
to Plaintiff's reserve account for the use and benefit of
defendant Carol Petersen.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this controversy are relatively simple as
evidenced by the small record filed in this matter.

In

order to simplify the existing record, however, Plaintiff
will describe the chronological events occurring after
defendant Carol Petersen's termination from St. Benedict's
Hospital and will describe the circumstances of the termination
as part of the proceedings during the appeal's referee hearing.
On July 8, 1981 Carol Petersen applied with the Utah
Department of Employment Security for unemployment benefits.

(R. 41).

Shortly thereafter, a form was sent to St. Benedict's

Hospital stating that Mrs. Petersen had given the reason for
separation as "quit to accept other employment."

The Hospital

replied that the reason for unemployment was "voluntarv
....
resignation to stay home with family."

(R.

40).

Petersen filed a form entitled "Claimant's Statement
on Voluntary Quit" and stated that the main reason she left
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work was "informed employer that I would be leaving later
in the year--told to quit now."

(Emphasis added).

She

further stated that she had interviewed with Hill Air Force
Base and had a verbal promise of employment and was waiting
for an opening.
then.

(R. 39).

She stated she had no intention of leaving
The examiner disqualified Mrs. Petersen

from unemployment compensation on the grounds t?at she quit
without good cause because of personal reasons.
actions caused her to become unemployed."

"Claimant's

(R. 39).

In reaching this decision the examiner had interviewed
Joe Featherston, the hospital's administrative supervisor,
who stated that Petersen had gone to her

im.~ediate

supervisor

and told her she would be quitting in order to stay home
with her family.

She was told she would have to give thirty

days notice and at the end of the thirty days she quit.
Featherston told the examiner "nothing was mentioned of the
claimant looking for other work."

(R. 38).

Petersen was notified of this decision (R. 37) and
shortly thereafter filed an appeal from the decision of the
representative.

She stated in her written statement that

she left because of severe harrassrnent by her supervisor
who she believed wanted to hire another nurse in her place.
She wrote "I decided I could no longer stand untrue and
highly emotional accusations of what a bad person I was."
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She further stated that she was forced out of her position
and that she believed she was entitled to compensation
until she could find further work either in patient education or inservice.

(R.

35-36).

On August 7 a notice was sent to Petersen that a
hearing would be held on August 17 before the appeals section
of the Department of Employment Security to determine whether
the claimant was able to work and was available for work,
whether the claimant voluntarily left work without good
cause, and whether the claimant was discharged for an act
or omission in connection with employment.

(R. 34).

On August 18 the appeals referee entered findings that
the claimant Carol Petersen had failed to appear for the
hearing and therefore affirmed the determination of the
department representative that she was not entitled to compensation since she had left work voluntarily without good
cause.

(R.

33).

On August 24 a "Notice to Appeals Section" was received
in which it was stated by defendant Carol Petersen that she
had been out of town when the notice to appear had arrived
and did not return until after the hearing had been held.
She requested a further hearing which was granted by the
appeals referee for September 1, 1981.

(R. 31-32).

On September 1, 1981 a hearing was held before Jerold E.
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Luker, the appeals referee, with the claimant Carol Petersen
testifying on her behalf and Joe Featherston testifying on
behalf of St. Benedict's Hospital.
is contained in the record.

A copy of this transcript

(R. 19-29).

Briefly, Petersen

stated that she was not working at the time of the hearing
but had taught a class at Hill Air Force Base for a short
period of time for a set fee of $100.00.

(R. 19-20).

Prior

to this she stated she had worked at St. Benedict's Hospital
in orientation and patient teaching which included instructing
new nurses that are hired at the hospital and also giving
patients instruction on such things as diabetic treatment
and pacemaker caree
nurse with a

B.S~

She noted that she was a registered

degree.

(R. 19-20).

Petersen stated that the reason she quit was that
she had felt harrassed from her supervisor.

She stated

that this "harrassment" had been going on for a couple of
months and that she finally went to Mr. Featherston to
speak with him concerning it.

Petersen told Featherston

that her supervisor kept informing her that she was not producing, was not doing her job, and always spoke with her at
inappropriate times.
Petersen testified that at the meeting Mr. Featherston
stated that he could see there was bad chemistry going on
and it was decided by both of them that she should take a
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leave of absence.

She testified she did not want to quit

St. Benedict's and had no intentions of ever quitting but,
on the other hand, she said she could not stay in the
environment because she was becoming physically ill.

She -

admitted she had not sought a doctor's advice concerning
her working conditions but diagnosed the problem herself
since she was a nurse.

(R. 23) .

Petersen proposed that. her

leave of absence should run two or three months until she
could get her self-esteem back together.

She had no inten-

tion to work elsewhere during that period of time.
She stated that there were other positions in the
hospital that could use her training and experience but
that she was denied a request for transfer.

She wanted to

transfer into a coronary care unit where she had previous
training.

Her employer denied this request but offered her

to be a staff nurse in an unfamiliar area.
She related that she did not try to find any employment
at the South Davis Hopsital and that she had learned from a
friend in mid-May there was nothing available at the
Dee Hospital.

~~Kay

(R. 23).

After.talking to Mr. Featherston, Carol Petersen stated
she went to see Pat Brown, Director of Nursing.

Brown told

her that she could not take a leave of absence. and could not
work in the coronary care unit.

She said she could still
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work at the hospital in other areas but Petersen felt these
areas were not in her field of expertise.
Petersen stated that she asked Mr. Featherston what
she needed to do in order to leave.

He told her she would

have to write a letter of resignation.

Petersen stated

that her supervisor typed out a little statement which said
she would be leaving June 30 and "made me sign it."

(R. 24).

Petersen testified that she was really sorry she signed
it and that she should not have been pressured into it.
She did not go over her supervisor's head to try to obtain
an extra month since she just "gave up."

She stated that

she believed her supervisor made her sign the paper

in

order that she (Petersen) would be gone by June 30 since
another girl would be coming in on July 1 who her supervisor
wanted in Petersen's job.

Petersen explained that she thought

the sole purpose in pressuring her was to allow this other
girl to begin work on July 1 since the new girl's husband
had just started work at another hospital and they both
wanted to begin at the same time.

(R. 25).

Joe Featherston testified on behalf of the
St. Benedict's Hopsital.

employe~

Mr. Featherston stated he was

St. Benedict's Director of Human Resources and Support
Services.

He related that he was not Petersen's immediate

supervisor but was the administrative person over that area.
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Mr. Featherston recalled that Carol Petersen had come
to him and told him she felt harrassed.

Because of Mr.

Featherston's prior discussions with Petersen's supervisor,
he knew there had been attempts to try to get Petersen to
come up to standard in a number of areas including absenteeism.
He stated that Carol Petersen would plan trips without
getting prior approval from her supervisor and that her
general performance level was not up to what it should have
been.

He stated that her supervisor was attempting to

counsel her to get her up to a performance and attendance
standard that could be accepted.

(R. 26).

During the conversation Mr. Featherston testified that
Petersen stated her supervisor had been harrassing her and
that there seemed to be no way to please her.

Mr. Featherston

stated, "She seemed to be at a point where she was willing to
just chuck it and quit."

Featherston suggested that she

should transfer to another area and arranged for an interview with Pat Brown, Director of Nursing.
Petersen was not placed in the coronary care unit
since her best friend was the head nurse of that unit and
the administration felt that it would not be a healthy
relationship for either of them.

Mr. Featherston stated

"it would put undue pressure on the head nurse for that ty·pe
of relationship and it wouldn't be healthy for Carol either."
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Petersen was offered a night position but she did not
accept it.

After her conversation with Pat Brown, Petersen

came back to Mro Featherston and said "I'm going to quit."
She told Mr. Featherston that she had talked to her supervisor and told her she would be available through July but
Mr. Featherston related that the hospital policies required
only thirty days notice and that it would be in the best
interests of everyone to only have thirty more days of work
rather than sixty.

(R. 25).

Had Petersen told him that

she wished to work through July it possibly could have been
arranged.
During the thirty-day period Petersen again talked to
Mr. Featherston and told him she was surprised that she
only had thirty days left.

Mr. Featherston explained to

Petersen that the hospital policy was thirty days in order
to allow a new person to fill the position.
Mr. Featherston testified that the hospital had a policy
and procedure for harrassment and that each employee received
a manual describing the formal grievance procedure.

(R.

27).

He recalled that Petersen never utilized this procedure in
complaining about the harrassment.

Featherston also denied

that Petersen had been pushed out for the purpose of making
room for another person since the hospital did not begin
its search until after she gave the hospital her notice of
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her intention to terminate

employment.

The search was

both internal and external and it took some time before the
proper candidate was found.
On rebuttal Petersen admitted that there was a grievance
policy procedure at the hospital but did not follow it because
she thought complaining to Mr. Featherston would be enough.

(R. 28-29).

She stated that she believed she had been

harrassed by the actions of her supervisor in criticizing her
at strategic times and preventing her from doing needed things.
She concluded by saying that she did not appeal this harrassment since her supervisor was a powerful person and she did
not feel she would have any chance in swaying judgments.
(R.

29).
On September 16, 1981 a decision was rendered by the

appeal referee conclu4ing that the claimant Carol Petersen
had voluntarily left work without good cause.

Basically,

the referee found that the claimant's work had not been fullv
""

accepted and that she had been reprimanded by her supervisor
for the areas of deficiency but that her job was not in
jeopardy and the employer did not plan to discharge her.

He

found that the claimant did not have any prospects for more
suitable work at the time she left St. Benedict's Hospital.
The referee concluded that since Petersen made no attempt to
extend an additional month after signing the notice of
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resignat~on

that she voluntarily agreed to the June 30,

1981 date.

He concluded-by stating:

There is evidence that the claimant had
less than a fully satisfactory relationship
with her supervisor. The poor relationship
appears to have been due to the claimant's
rejection of instructions given to her by her
supervisor in the normal course of supervisor/
subordinate interactions, and not to any willful
attempt by the supervisor to harrass the claimant.
Personnel policy of the hospital as contained
in written information made available to the
claimant provides an avenue for relief to
employees who feel they have been wrongfully
or unfairly treated. The claimant was aware of
the remedies available to her, yet she chose
not to pursue them. The appeals referee concludes that·the situation was not so compelling
as to constitute good cause for leaving work
within the meaning of the Utah Employment
Security Act.
(R. 15-16).
On September 24, 1981 Petersen wrote a letter to the
appeals referee responding to the decision.
A

(R.

12-14).

rebuttal to Mrs. Petersen's letter was filed by Mr.

Featherston on October 2, 1981.

(R. 9-10).

An appeal was

docketed with the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
and a decision was rendered by the Board on November 10, 1981.
The decision of the appeals referee was reversed.

The Board

gave the following explanation for the reversal.
In reversing the decision of the Appeal
Referee the Board of Review notes the claimant's
testimony that on several occasions she was
criticized by her supervisor just before conducting training sessions and that she was denied
a transfer to another assignment for which she
was experienced solely because the supervisor
of the new unit would have been a friend of the
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claimant's. The claimant's testimony regarding
these circumstnaces was undisputed by the
employer's representative. Although such circumstances are not compelling and therefore do not
constitute good cause, they are sufficiently
mitigating as to give reason to the claimant's
decision to leave work. The record indicates
that the claimant immediately commenced a search
for work upon leaving her employment.
Therefore,
a denial of benefits in the instant case would
be contrary to equity and good conscience.
(R. 6).
(Emphasis added) .
It is from this decision that the present petition for
writ of review is taken.

(R.

2).

ARGUMENT
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS ERRONEOUS
IN THAT IT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE UNEMPLOYMENT
SECURITY ACT IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW.
Plaintiff acknowledges that in order to overturn the
decision of the Board of Review it must show that such
decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or as a
matter of law_ the determination was wrong.

Continental Oil

Co. v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 568 P.2d
727

(Utah 1977).

However, even with this difficult burden

Plaintiff believes that in the instant case the Board of
Review clearly erred as a matter of law and therefore must
be reversed.
The statute upon which compensation was originally denied
is found in Section 35-4-S(a) in the 1981 pocket supplement
to the Utah Code.

This section has been amended several

times with the last amendment being in 1979.
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Prior to the 1979 amendment the statute provided that
an individual would be ineligible for benefits if the
claimant left work voluntarily without good cause.
the previous standard of "good cause

11

Thus,

had been established

for many years and this Court defined such requirement in
Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 567
P.2d 626 (Utah 1977).
In the Denby case this Court quoted from various authorities
in elaborating the "good cause" requirement of the statute.
Court stated the following:
What is "good cause" must reflect the underlying purpose of the act to relieve against the
distress of involuntary unemployment. The seeming
paradox of allowing benefits to an individual whose
unemployment is of his own volition disappears when
the context of the words is viewed in that light.
The Legislature contemplated that when an individual
voluntarily leaves a job under the pressure of circumstances which may reasonably be viewed as having
compelled him to do so, the termination of his
employment is involuntary for purposes of the Act.
In statutory contemplation he cannot then reasonably
be judged as free to stay at the job.
Id. at 630.
This Court further elaborated the procedure for establishing
"good cause" and its definition by stating the following:
The initial determination of "good cause"
for vountarily leaving employment, is a mixed
question of law and fact for the administrative
agency. A claimant has the burden of showing
good cause for leaving, when he voluntarily
terminates suitable employment.
"Good cause"
has been defined as "such cause as would similarly
affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity,
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This

and is limited to those instances where the unemployment is caused by external pressures so compelling
that a reasonably prudent person, exercising
ordinary common sense and prudence, would be
justified in quitting under similar circumstances.
Id. at 630.
The "good cause" standard is adopted throughout the
country to determine whether voluntary termination justifies
unemployment compensation.

Cases similar to the instant one

have held that "good cause" is not established when a superintendent criticizes a worker for substandard work, Boodry
v. Eddy Bakeries Co., 397 P.2d 256 (Idaho 1964), and when
an employee fails to follow grievance procedures as to
disputes in the conditions of employment.

Beaman v. Aynes,

393 P.2d 152 (Ariz. 1964).
The Board of Review in this case recognized that the
claim by Carol Petersen of harrassment by her supervisor was
not substantiated by the facts and that the evidence showed
she was being reprimanded for substandard perfor2ance.
Board also recognized that her failure to be

t~ansferred

The
to

another unit upon request did not constitute good cause.·
Specifically, the Board stated that such "circumsntaces are
not compelling and therefore do not constitute good cause."
(R.

6).

The error in the Board's decision results from the
language contained in the 1979 amendment to Section 35-4-S(a).
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The present statute still retains the original "good cause"
language for compensation but then states the following
additional caveat:
Provided, that no claimant shall be ineligible
for benefits if the claimant leaves work under
circumstances of such a nature that it would be
contrary to equity and good conscience to impose
a disqualification.
The Commission shall in cooperation with the
employer consider for the purposes of this Act,
the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market
in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and
good conscience .
The 1979 amendment has created an apparent inconsistency
in the application of this section.

The first portion of

the statute requires a "good cause" determination if benefits
are to be received.

The added ·portion, however, seemingly

negates this requirement by applying a standard of "equity
and good conscience."
Plaintiff has been unable to find any similar wording
of a statute in the United States in which "equity and good
conscience" applies to qualifications of unemployment benefits.
The term, however, is frequently used in statutes in which
over-payment of claims has occurred and the recipient claimant
is requested to pay back the previous wrongful payments.
These decisions indicate that the term "equity and good
conscience" is "an elastic expression" of "unusual generality"

-15-
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which "anticipates that the trier of fact, instead of
attempting to channelize his decision within rigid and
specific rules, will draw upon precepts of justice and
morality as the basis for his ruling."

See City of Lead-

ville v. Sewer Co., 107 P. 801 (Colo. 1909); Gilles v. Dept.
of Human Resources Development, 521 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1974).
The Gilles decision is the leading authority on
describing the terms "equity and good conscience."

This

decision noted that the term had its probable source from
the 1974 Social Security Act.

The Act defined these terms

as follows:
Against "equity and good conscience" means
that adjustment or recovery of an incorrect
payment . . . will be considered inequitable if
an individual, because of a notice that such
payment would be made or by reason of the
incorrect payment, relinquished a valuable
right . . ·. or changed his position for the
WO rs e .
. . .
2 0 c . F • R • 4 0 4 . s 0 9 ( 19 7 9 ) .
The California Supreme Court noted that the term "equity
and good conscience" is an extremely general term with virtually no boundary or limitation except in the mind of the
chancelor.

The court noted that Black's Law Dictionary

states the following:
The term "equity" in its broadest and most
general signification .
. denotes the spirit and
habit of fairness, justice, and right dealing
which would regulate the intercourse of men with
men.
[In] this sense its obligation is
ethical rather than jural, and its discussion
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belongs to the sphere of morals~
It is grounded
in the precepts of the conscience, not in any
sanction of positive law.
In a restricted sense,
the word denotes equal and impartial justice .
.;
justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason
or ethical insight, but independent of the formulated body of law.
521 P.2d at 116, fn. 10.
The court noted that "conscience" is defined in similar
generality and that the term "ignores reason, defies argument, and is unaccountable and irresponsible to all human
tests and standards; it is a law unto itself, and its scruples,
and its teachings are not amenable to human tribunals, but
rests alone with its possessor and his God."

Id.

See also,

Duenas-Rodriguez v. The Industrial Commission, 606 P.2d 437
(Colao 1980); Gettinger v. Celebrezze, ·218 F .. Supp. 161
(D .. N.Y ..

1963) ..

Thus, the Board of Review conceded that the claimant had
fa).led to establish "good cause 11 for terminating her employment but determined under the "equity and good conscience"
standard the criticism by her supervisor and the failure to

be transferred to another department were "sufficiently mitigati
to give reason to the claimant's decision to leave work."
(R.

6).

The interpretation by the Board of Review of this statute
should not stand.

Under this interpretation even when good

cause is not shown the vague, general, and unlimited standard
of "equity and good conscience" is applicable.which, as stated
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above, cont.ains no limitations or judicial standards for
review.

Thus, while a court could determine if "good cause"

is present in a situation it cannot determine the "equity
and good conscience" of the Commission in reviewing each
case.
The interpretation given by the Board of Review would
make the "good cause" language in the statute meaningless.
Obviously, there is no point in even determining "good cause"
if the Commission has an unlimited ability to determine in
equity and good conscience whether the circumstances justify
a disqualification.

This interpretation, therefore, makes

the statute completely inconsistent by requiring a standard
and defined definition at the beginning of the statute but
overriding such definition by a broad and unlimited term at
the end

of the statute.

It is common statutory construction that when possible
a court must give every word, phrase, clause and sentence of
a statute a consistent and reasonable meaning.
Union Pacific Railway Co., 261 P.

9 (Utah 1921).

Robinson v.
If there

is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of
a provision it is appropriate to analyze the act in its
entiretyr in light of its objective, and to harmonize its
provisions in accordance with legislative intent and purpose.
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980).
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Likewise, this Court has held on numerous occasions that the
doctrine of ejusdem generis requires that specific provisions
prevail over more general expressions when determining the
meaning or application of a provision of an act.

Id.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case and statute
results in the following analysis.

The Legislature intended

to further define the phrase "good cause" by the 1979 amendment.

It requested that the Commission in determining good

cause shall "in cooperation with the employer consider for
the purposes of this Act, the reasonableness of the claimant's
actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market."

This

interpretation is consistent with the Denby opinion of this
Court in which this Court held that a claimant must expose
himself unequivocally to the labor market in order to receive
compensation and that good cause exists when a reasonably
prudent person exercising ordinary common sense would be
justified in quitting under similar circumstances.
In other words, the statute as written places the same
tests for "equity and good conscience" i.e., "the reasonableness of claimant's actions, and the extent to which the
actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the
labor market" as does the definition of "good cause" as
elaborated in the Denby decision.
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While this statute is unartfully drawn the drafters
could not have intended to apply two different standards
to the same factual situation.

If the term "good cause"

is to have any meaning whatsoever then it must be read in
conjunction with the "equity and good conscience" language
as a standard in determining good cause.

To view the two

standards separately completely defeats any purpo?e in
arriving at "good cause" since such a determination then
becomes inunaterial to the normally accepted, broad, and
unlimited definition of "equity and good conscience."
In the instant case, the Board of Review should have
determined whether defendant Carol Petersen acted in a
reasonable manner and showed a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in determining whether "good cause"
had been established.

Had it done so in terms of the "good

cause" standard it would have concluded that the claimant
was not entitled to unemployment compensation.
It would not be reasonable for a person to leave their
employment merely because they have been criticized on
several occasions by their supervisor regardless of when
these occasions occurred.

Likewise, it would not be reason-

able for a person to leave their employment when they are
denied a transfer due to the employer's policy of preventing
conflicts between best friends in a subordinate and superior
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position.

The Board would have concluded that these factors

were not sufficient to justify the voluntary termination
under the "good cause" mandate.
For this reason, the decision of the Board of Review
as it is now written should not prevail.

The decision must

be reversed as a matter of law based upon the evidence
existing in the record or, in the alternative, the matter
should be remanded to the Board of Review so that it can
apply the appropriate standard.
CONCLUSION
The present appeal involves the first time this Court
has dealt with the 1979 amendment to Section 33-4-S(a),
U.C.A.

It is important that the seemingly inconsistent

language contained in this subsection be reconciled by
this Court in order to establish a future standard for review
in the numerous cases which arise regarding voluntary termination of employment.
The Legislature could not have intended to give the
Board of Review two standards to apply in these types of
cases.

While the "good cause" standard uses establisheq

criteria and guidelines the other "equity and good conscience"
standard can have no judicially reviewable criteria.

Thus,

it must be assumed that the Legislature intended on merely
further defining "good cause" rather than abolishing it.
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The problem simply reduces itself to the question of
whether a person has left work voluntarily for "good cause"
or not.

If the person has a reasonable basis for having

left work and the actions show a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market then good cause is present.

If,

on the other hand, the actions of the claimant are unreasonable or do not reflect a continuing attachment to the labor
market, then good cause has not been shown.

The use of the

"equity and good conscience" language cannot be utilized to
circumvent the "good cause" requirement.
For these reasons Plaintiff respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the determination made by the Board of
Review and hold as a matter of law that the evidence does
not justify defendant Carol Petersen's claim for unemployment
compensation.

In the alternative, this matter should be

remanded to the Board of Review for application of the correct
legal standard.
Respectfully submitted,

~q.~
Glenn J. Mecham

~-JJ.

Craig~ Cook
Attorneys for Plaintiff
St. Benedict's Hospital
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